The Copenhagen Interpretation: Science or Ideology? A Radical Critique of the Dominance of a Self-Contradictory Paradigm

Abstract

The Copenhagen interpretation, the dominant framework of quantum mechanics, is scientifically invalid due to its logical inconsistencies, philosophical ambiguities, and unproven assumptions. The Schrödinger equation, rooted in interaction-dependent experimental data, cannot describe the intrinsic nature of isolated systems, leading to an epistemological paradox. The measurement problem, the claim of inherent uncertainty, and the inability to account for pre-measurement reality render Copenhagen unscientific. In contrast, Bohmian mechanics, with its deterministic, nonlocal, and realist framework, resolves these flaws while reproducing all quantum predictions without ambiguity. The marginalization of Bohm and the quasi-sacred protection of Copenhagen stem from historical (McCarthyism), philosophical (humanism, relativism, secularism), and institutional (paradigmatic hegemony) factors. Drawing on historical and contemporary sources, this critique calls for a critical reappraisal of quantum education and research to liberate science from ideological constraints.

1. Introduction

The Copenhagen interpretation, developed in the 1920s by Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg, has been the dominant framework of quantum mechanics for nearly a century. It posits that quantum systems are described by a wave function (ψ) in Hilbert space, exhibit inherent uncertainty (Δx·Δp≥ℏ/2), and undergo wave function collapse to a definite state upon measurement [Bohr, 1913; Heisenberg, 1927]. Despite its success in predicting phenomena such as electron diffraction [Davisson & Germer, 1927], atomic spectra [Bohr, 1913], and Bose-Einstein condensation [Anderson et al., 1995], Copenhagen suffers from logical contradictions and philosophical ambiguities.

This paper argues that Copenhagen is unscientific, invalid, and ambiguous, as it relies on interaction-dependent data, fails to resolve the measurement problem, and assumes inherent uncertainty without proof. In contrast, Bohmian mechanics [Bohm, 1952a, 1952b] offers a realist and deterministic framework that overcomes these issues. We also examine why Copenhagen is protected like a “sacred text” while Bohm is marginalized, drawing on historical [Cushing, 1994] and contemporary sources [Laloë, 2019; Norsen, 2017; Pinto et al., 2021]. The goal is to advocate for a critical reappraisal to free science from ideological biases.

2. Logical Inconsistencies of the Copenhagen Interpretation

2.1. Circular Flaw of Interaction-Dependent Data

The Schrödinger equation, the cornerstone of quantum mechanics, is given by: iℏ ∂ψ/∂t = Ĥψ where ψ is the wave function, Ĥ is the Hamiltonian, and ℏ is the reduced Planck constant [Schrödinger, 1926]. It was designed to match experimental data from phenomena like electron diffraction [Davisson & Germer, 1927], the photoelectric effect [Einstein, 1905], and atomic spectroscopy [Bohr, 1913]. However, these experiments all involve interactions between the quantum system and measurement apparatus:

• Electron diffraction requires interaction with a crystal lattice [Davisson & Germer, 1927].

• Atomic spectra arise from photon emission/absorption [Bohr, 1913].

• The double-slit experiment depends on particle-detector interactions [Young, 1802].

Copenhagen claims the equation describes the intrinsic state of isolated systems, but its data come from non-isolated systems. This creates an epistemological paradox: a theory derived from “contaminated” interaction data cannot prove the nature of isolated systems [Laloë, 2019]. Even Copenhagen proponents acknowledge this logical loop but deem it inevitable [Myrvold, 2017].

2.2. The Measurement Problem and Ambiguity

Copenhagen asserts that the wave function collapses upon measurement, but:

• “Measurement” lacks a clear definition [Schlosshauer, 2007].

• The collapse mechanism is unexplained and treated as an axiom [Feynman et al., 1965].

• The observer’s role is ambiguous, leading to philosophical debates about consciousness [Wigner, 1961].

For instance, in the double-slit experiment, a detector eliminates the interference pattern, but Copenhagen does not explain why or how [Feynman et al., 1965]. This ambiguity renders Copenhagen unscientific, as scientific theories require testable mechanisms [Norsen, 2017].

2.3. Unproven Assumption of Inherent Uncertainty

Copenhagen treats quantum uncertainty (Δx·Δp≥ℏ/2) as an intrinsic property of nature [Heisenberg, 1927]. However, its evidence comes from interaction-based experiments (e.g., diffraction, spectroscopy). Phenomena like atomic stability [Bohr, 1913] or Bose-Einstein condensation [Anderson et al., 1995] are observed through interactions. Thus, it cannot be proven whether uncertainty is inherent or a result of measurement disturbances [Laloë, 2019].

2.4. Quantum Field Theory (QFT): A Persistent Deadlock

Copenhagen defenders often cite QFT, where particles are field excitations, and interactions (e.g., electromagnetic) are encoded in the QED Lagrangian: ℒ = ψ̅(iγ^μ∂_μ - m)ψ + eψ̅γ^μψA_μ [Peskin & Schroeder, 1995]. QFT yields precise predictions (e.g., Lamb shift) [Kinoshita, 1995]. However:

• It relies on interaction-based data (e.g., particle scattering).

• It does not resolve the measurement problem.

• It cannot prove interactions are intrinsic [Norsen, 2017].

QFT remains trapped in Copenhagen’s logical loop [Laloë, 2019].

3. Superiority of Bohmian Mechanics

Bohmian mechanics [Bohm, 1952a, 1952b] offers a deterministic and nonlocal framework:

• Particles have definite positions and momenta, guided by the wave function (ψ) as a pilot wave.

• The guidance equation: v = (ℏ/m) Im(∇ψ/ψ)

• Quantum effects (interference, entanglement) arise from the nonlocal dynamics of the pilot wave [Holland, 1993].

Bohm resolves Copenhagen’s flaws:

• No Measurement Problem: Measurement is a physical interaction [Bohm, 1952a].

• Determinism: Uncertainty is epistemic [Goldstein, 2013].

• Realism: Particles have objective reality, consistent with Bell experiments [Bell, 1964; Hensen et al., 2015].

• Experimental Consistency: Bohm reproduces all quantum predictions (double-slit, atomic stability) [Holland, 1993].

For example, in the double-slit experiment, the pilot wave guides particles through both slits, producing the interference pattern without collapse. Atomic stability results from stable electron trajectories under the pilot wave [Holland, 1993]. Bohm also applies to quantum computing [Dürr et al., 2014] and quantum gravity [Pinto et al., 2021].

Table 1: Comparison of Copenhagen and Bohmian Mechanics

Feature	Copenhagen	Bohm
Pre-Measurement Reality	Denies (“properties don’t exist”)	Affirms (particles have definite position/velocity)
Measurement Problem	Unresolved (ambiguous collapse)	Resolved (physical interaction)
Uncertainty	Inherent (nature’s property)	Epistemic (due to unknown initial conditions)
Nonlocality	Paradoxical	Intrinsic and accepted
Experimental Consistency	Yes	Yes
Modern Applications	Limited to standard computations	Quantum computing, quantum gravity

4. Marginalization of Bohmian Mechanics

Bohm was sidelined for non-scientific reasons:

• Historical: Bohm’s exile during McCarthyism (1951) damaged his credibility [Freire, 2005]. Heisenberg called it “unscientific” [Heisenberg, 1958], and Pauli labeled it “socialist” [Cushing, 1994].

• Philosophical: Bohm’s determinism conflicts with humanism (denying free will), and its nonlocality clashes with materialism [Bell, 1987; Cushing, 1994].

• Institutional: Copenhagen controlled journals and academic positions, engineering scientific discourse [Cushing, 1994; Stanford, 2017].

Critics like Einstein (EPR paradox) were dismissed as “outdated” [Einstein et al., 1935; Cushing, 1994].

5. Quasi-Sacred Protection of Copenhagen

Copenhagen aligns with modern ideologies:

• Humanism: The observer’s role places humans at reality’s center [Wigner, 1961].

• Relativism: Inherent uncertainty supports rejecting absolute truths [Kuhn, 1970].

• Secularism: Focus on observable phenomena sidesteps metaphysical questions [Bell, 1987].

This alignment makes Copenhagen a “sacred text” [Cushing, 1994]. Bell experiments [Hensen et al., 2015; Aspect et al., 2022] and entanglement applications [Horodecki et al., 2009] have not disrupted its hegemony [Norsen, 2017].

Table 2: Copenhagen’s Justifications and Their Critique

Copenhagen’s Claim	Scientific Critique
“Simpler and more intuitive”	Bohm performs the same calculations without contradictions [Norsen, 2017].
“Bohm is redundant”	Bohm offers a complete picture; applies to quantum computing [Dürr et al., 2014].
“Bohm’s nonlocality is unscientific”	Nonlocality is confirmed by Bell experiments [Hensen et al., 2015].
“Copenhagen matches experiments”	Bohm matches experiments without philosophical ambiguities [Holland, 1993].

6. Conclusion

The Copenhagen interpretation is unscientific and invalid due to its reliance on interaction-dependent data, ambiguous measurement problem, and unproven inherent uncertainty. The Schrödinger equation cannot describe isolated systems, and QFT remains trapped in the same logical loop. Bohmian mechanics, with its deterministic, nonlocal, and realist framework, resolves these flaws and reproduces quantum predictions without paradoxes.

Bohm’s marginalization and Copenhagen’s protection stem from historical, philosophical, and institutional biases. Copenhagen’s alignment with humanism, relativism, and secularism has made it a quasi-sacred paradigm. For science to progress, the scientific community must embrace critical thinking and revisit realist interpretations. Bohm’s applications in quantum computing [Dürr et al., 2014] and quantum gravity [Pinto et al., 2021] highlight its potential for physics’ future. The time for a paradigmatic revolution has come.

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